The occasional comment about the philosophy of war: my view, not the military's.
Wednesday, July 18, 2012
Monday, July 16, 2012
Forthcoming books
I noticed two forthcoming books by authors of blogs I read that might interest some of the readers of this blog: The Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Perspectives on Violence, Homicide, and War, edited by Todd K. Shackelford and Viviana A. Weekes-Shackelford and from PEA soup Cecile Fabre's Cosmopolitan War.
The Moral Case for Drones?
The New York times ran a piece the other day on the moral case for drone attacks. The piece is not all that sophisticated or interesting. It is mostly boring because they are defending (or at least quoting people who are defending) drone warfare.
However, on closer inspection, what they are actually defending is the moral preference of a drone attack on a target to an attack on the same target by an assassination team. So the article is not saying anything about the ethics of assassination, but rather it is saying that if you will assassinate someone, it is morally preferable that you do it by remote control because you minimize certain kinds of risks.
Yawn.
The article barely mentions the morally important points relating to the fact that with drones it is now far easier to actually carry out these assassinations, making them more common, and now a policy tool of the Obama administration. All that is not to say that there is anything wrong with such attacks, but rather to say that The Times discusses the banal questions and glosses over the important ones. Any increase in precision is good, both militarily and I would say morally. But that is not where the drone controversy is in play. No one ever seriously suggested that drones are evil because they are more precise. People who dislike drones on moral grounds dislike them because they now make it possible to assassinate targets with relative ease and fewer repercussions.
However, on closer inspection, what they are actually defending is the moral preference of a drone attack on a target to an attack on the same target by an assassination team. So the article is not saying anything about the ethics of assassination, but rather it is saying that if you will assassinate someone, it is morally preferable that you do it by remote control because you minimize certain kinds of risks.
Yawn.
The article barely mentions the morally important points relating to the fact that with drones it is now far easier to actually carry out these assassinations, making them more common, and now a policy tool of the Obama administration. All that is not to say that there is anything wrong with such attacks, but rather to say that The Times discusses the banal questions and glosses over the important ones. Any increase in precision is good, both militarily and I would say morally. But that is not where the drone controversy is in play. No one ever seriously suggested that drones are evil because they are more precise. People who dislike drones on moral grounds dislike them because they now make it possible to assassinate targets with relative ease and fewer repercussions.
Sunday, July 15, 2012
Training ethics
The New York times raises an interesting ethics question. Are there real moral problems "practicing" on unwitting civilians if it has no real impact on their lives? (This question has real repercussions for my line of work too.)
In the story, drones are "tracking" civilian cars, presumably in the US, simply to give the drone pilots practice in tracking things. If my car was being tracked just so someone can practice looking at me from 20,000 feet, I'd certainly feel uncomfortable. And what if the US Air Force discovered something they didn't like, would they act on it? Does that violate federal surveillance laws? What if the drone happened upon a drug deal or something worse? Does practicing on unwitting american violate the Posse Comitatus Act?
Secondly (and not mentioned by the story), what if the Air Force practiced on foreigners? Would that make a difference? Would if violate the sovereignty of that country? If some other country was doing it to the US, I am sure we'd freak out. Is it any different than observing random strangers in some foreign country with a satellite? Is that legal?
In the story, drones are "tracking" civilian cars, presumably in the US, simply to give the drone pilots practice in tracking things. If my car was being tracked just so someone can practice looking at me from 20,000 feet, I'd certainly feel uncomfortable. And what if the US Air Force discovered something they didn't like, would they act on it? Does that violate federal surveillance laws? What if the drone happened upon a drug deal or something worse? Does practicing on unwitting american violate the Posse Comitatus Act?
Secondly (and not mentioned by the story), what if the Air Force practiced on foreigners? Would that make a difference? Would if violate the sovereignty of that country? If some other country was doing it to the US, I am sure we'd freak out. Is it any different than observing random strangers in some foreign country with a satellite? Is that legal?
Cyberattacks and JWT
How does Just War Theory apply to cyberattacks? A forthcoming paper by Leonard Kahn has a discussion.
Monday, July 2, 2012
Bioterror?
It has been suggested that an invasive insect has been introduced into California to kill the eucalyptus trees as a biological weapon. I am personally skeptical, but if true, this is an interesting sort of terrorism. It seeks to attack a species of tree that is mostly used for shade. If it is terror, its will succeed by annoying many Californians. It is hard to even take credit for such a thing and to what end? I suppose destroying a bit of ecosystem could be a terrorist's goal.
With new weapons come new questions. Anything worth thinking about here?
(I wonder if this is some kind of revenge for this Eucalyptus tale.)
(H/T /.)
Monday, June 25, 2012
Saturday, June 23, 2012
Ethics and Cyberspace
With the success of Stuxnet and now newer computer malware that are specifically designed with military targets in mind, it is time to start thinking seriously about ethical questions involving weapons that work in cyberspace. The US Air force has Cybercommand, Germany is now starting an offensive cyberwarefare unit, Russia has been alleged to employ cyberwarefare, and other nations like Israel, North Korea, the UK, and China have also been exploiting cyberspace for military purposes.
But what are the ethical issues involved? (Here are some practical issues.) I can think of a few off the top of my head. First are the traditional questions: How are civilians in enemy countries impacted by cyberwarefare and what responsibilities do countries have to only target military cyber infrastructure? Is this perhaps a kind of "warfare" where the discrimination standard breaks down? After all, chances are that few people will die as a direct consequence of a cyberattack on a country. So how to we weigh the double effect consequences?
Another question I was thinking about is how to deal with proliferation. There is little doubt that weapons proliferation has ethical repercussions. Cyber weapons can potentially be copied quickly and effectively and presumably with disastrous consequences. What ethical responsibilities to governments have to prevent this?
Also, is it really war, is it really a weapon, if individuals are not getting physically harmed? Is this the new kind of war people are talking about when they envision the future of war? Imagine immobilizing the enemy without harming anyone? Is it possible to win wars that way and if so, can this mean the end of war as we know it?
Finally, this all seems like an important step in moving war away from the nation state and putting non-state actors on the same level.
(H/T /.)
But what are the ethical issues involved? (Here are some practical issues.) I can think of a few off the top of my head. First are the traditional questions: How are civilians in enemy countries impacted by cyberwarefare and what responsibilities do countries have to only target military cyber infrastructure? Is this perhaps a kind of "warfare" where the discrimination standard breaks down? After all, chances are that few people will die as a direct consequence of a cyberattack on a country. So how to we weigh the double effect consequences?
Another question I was thinking about is how to deal with proliferation. There is little doubt that weapons proliferation has ethical repercussions. Cyber weapons can potentially be copied quickly and effectively and presumably with disastrous consequences. What ethical responsibilities to governments have to prevent this?
Also, is it really war, is it really a weapon, if individuals are not getting physically harmed? Is this the new kind of war people are talking about when they envision the future of war? Imagine immobilizing the enemy without harming anyone? Is it possible to win wars that way and if so, can this mean the end of war as we know it?
Finally, this all seems like an important step in moving war away from the nation state and putting non-state actors on the same level.
(H/T /.)
Friday, June 8, 2012
Ethics and veterans
I am generally a fan of Andrew J. Bacevich's writing. Here he reviews James Wright's Those Who Have Borne the Battle. The book talks about the relationship the United States has to those who have served and also who served in the first place.
I think that veterans pose a few important ethics questions worth exploring for military ethics. For one, we should think about the virtue of gratitude. Gratitude is often taken as a virtue. I would argue that in democratic countries that do not have drafts, veterans deserve their country's gratitude for being the people who were willing to put themselves at the disposal of the democracy. Regardless of whether or not you like how the democracy acted, they acted at the behest of the country, often without prior knowledge of what they would be asked to do, and often put themselves in more danger than most people would feel comfortable doing. (Pace an argument once made by Stephen Kershnar that said, among other things, that members of the military are adequately compensated, and thus do not deserve special gratitude.)
Of course, gratitude is not much. It is an emotion some people feel for some things, and only sometimes actually benefits the veteran. What does a country owe its vets? What attitude ought citizens have toward veterans? What obligations do veterans have?
Any thoughts?
I think that veterans pose a few important ethics questions worth exploring for military ethics. For one, we should think about the virtue of gratitude. Gratitude is often taken as a virtue. I would argue that in democratic countries that do not have drafts, veterans deserve their country's gratitude for being the people who were willing to put themselves at the disposal of the democracy. Regardless of whether or not you like how the democracy acted, they acted at the behest of the country, often without prior knowledge of what they would be asked to do, and often put themselves in more danger than most people would feel comfortable doing. (Pace an argument once made by Stephen Kershnar that said, among other things, that members of the military are adequately compensated, and thus do not deserve special gratitude.)
Of course, gratitude is not much. It is an emotion some people feel for some things, and only sometimes actually benefits the veteran. What does a country owe its vets? What attitude ought citizens have toward veterans? What obligations do veterans have?
Any thoughts?
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